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The protection of the built environment has been given increasing attention over 
recent years, with physical interventions being integrated into the built environment 
itself and an impetus on the role of those who are responsible for its design, 
construction and operation. Of particular note has been debate and behaviour 
surrounding the incorporation of security measures to specifically mitigate terrorist 
threats, as varying perceptions regarding obligations and incentives to do so have 
resulted in vulnerable places remaining unprotected. As part of on-going research into 
the security of the built environment, a three-year study into the protection of 
crowded places from terrorism has determined the factors that influence whether such 
measures are incorporated into built assets, in order to further understanding of the 
perceptions and reality behind decision making. Drawing on data obtained from 
interviews with 47 construction management and security professionals in the UK and 
USA, as well as observations during site visits and document analysis, a framework is 
put forward that presents the factors that influence whether security measures are 
incorporated, as well as the factors that influence the value of the measures 
themselves. The framework highlights the need to consider the incorporation of 
physical measures during the early design stages whilst also reconciling the 
requirements of such measures against those of other design criteria; to understand the 
intricacies surrounding risk mitigation within time and cost constraints, and to accrue 
maximum value. Such a framework, it is argued, would aid policy and key decision 
makers in co-ordinating their efforts and effectively protecting vulnerable places from 
the range of risks that the UK faces, thereby mitigating a range of natural hazards and 
major accidents, not just specific threats. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The design, construction and operation of the built environment is influenced by a vast 
array of legislated and non-legislated considerations. Most notably however, a 
plethora of hazards, threats and major accidents pose significant risks to the built 
environment itself (Cabinet Office 2012; Harre-Young 2012; HM Government 2010; 
Edwards 2009). Whilst it has been acknowledged that the identification of every risk 
may not be achievable, it has been noted that the vulnerability and protection of the 
built environment affects everyone, as everyone interacts with it (Bosher and Dainty 
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2011: 2). Over recent decades, the growing investigation of the aforementioned risks 
has resulted in a range of research into notions of resilience, safety, security, and 
counter-terrorism, most notably in relation to integrating physical interventions into 
the built environment to protect those who use it. Despite riverine, pluvial and coastal 
flooding, and severe windstorms, posing the greatest risk to the built environment, and 
that their occurrence and severity is likely to increase due to changing climatic 
conditions (Bosher and Dainty 2011; Crichton 2008), of significant concern has been 
the threat of terrorism faced within the UK through the intentional targeting of 
crowded places. Concern has been raised regarding how the built environment has 
been designed and retrofitted to reduce its vulnerability to, and mitigate the impacts 
of, terrorist attacks (Coaffee 2010). Building on a three-year study into the protection 
of crowded places from terrorism in which a theoretical framework was developed to 
understand the factors that influenced whether crowded places were protected, as well 
as the value of counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) themselves, the research questions 
whether such a framework can be used to understand the protection of places that are 
vulnerable to not just the threat of terrorism, but also the plethora of other threats, 
hazards, and major accidents that pose risks to the built environment. The research 
also highlights the need to consider the incorporation of physical interventions into the 
built environment whilst reconciling their needs with those of other design 
considerations, to understand the intricacies of mitigation within time and cost 
constraints, and to accrue maximum value from incorporating measures. In doing so, 
it is anticipated that further debate and guidance will be encouraged on whether, and 
how, principles of security should be further aligned with the design, construction and 
operation of the built environment.  
SECURITY AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
The built environment is the substantive physical framework that enables society to 
function in its social, political, economic and institutional aspects (Geis 2000). In its 
design, construction and operation, a vast number of considerations need to be made, 
some of which are legislated for, some of which are not; political, social, economic, 
technological, environmental and ethical, legal, system-focused, structural, and 
strategic factors are all inherent in the design and retro-fitting of the built environment 
(Allan and Davis 2006). System considerations include security, and taking the risk of 
natural hazards as an example, a vast array of natural hazards pose a risk to the built 
environment and each require an in-depth understanding of their nature and mitigation 
in order to reduce their likelihood and lessen their impacts effectively and 
proportionately. Whilst the identification of every risk may not be achievable, it has 
been acknowledged that the vulnerability and protection of the built environment 
affects everyone, as everyone interacts with it (Bosher and Dainty 2011). The 
reduction in vulnerability of the built environment to such risks is, therefore, of 
significant importance.  
In response to this there has been a growing trend towards the incorporation of 
physical interventions into the built environment so that the potential impacts of 
hazards, threats and major accidents occurring are avoided or reduced. Whilst the aim 
of the paper is not to critically examine or gain intricate knowledge regarding the 
mitigation of all hazards, threats and major accidents, there is clearly a need to 
anticipate, prevent and prepare for, and respond to and recover from, their potential 
impacts as far as is reasonably practicable. The anticipation of irregularity and change 
in the nature of such risks has also been an emerging appreciation, evident in a 
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growing body of literature, and has in part led to the concept of resilience, in which its 
Latin roots of 'resilio' mean to 'jump back' (Sapountzaki 2007).  
However, it has been recognised that in most cases it will not be sufficient for a 
system to simply 'jump back' or return to its original state, as its original state 
contributed to the disaster or disruption occurring (Bosher 2008). Therefore, the 
'resilience' (and security) of a system is its ability to avoid, or at least absorb, 
disruption, and thereby draw on anticipation, preparation and preparedness, and 
response and recovery (Institute for Public Policy and Research 2009). The resilience 
and security of systems are therefore influenced by both human understanding and 
action, as outlined above; paradoxically, the built environment and its related planning 
practices are not only affected by disasters, but they can also constitute their causes 
(Wamsler 2008: 350). Or, in the words of Mileti (1999: 12) "human beings - not 
nature - are the cause of disaster losses". The way in which the built environment has 
expanded over the past 30 years has, arguably, had little regard for such influences 
and has not only caused disasters, but exacerbated their impacts (Dainty and Bosher 
2008). Therefore, those who design, construct and operate the built environment have 
a significant role to play in the avoidance and reduction of disasters and their impacts, 
and greater debate and understanding regarding the protection of the built 
environment from the plethora of hazards, threats and major accidents that pose a risk 
to it is needed. Such an understanding has been developed specifically in relation to 
the aforementioned threat of terrorism, as recent research (see Harre-Young 2012) has 
explored the terrorist threat itself, and whether and how the design, construction and 
operation of the built environment can be used to protect it. 
TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 
Terrorism has a long established history in the UK, which is evident from a range of 
literature (Silke 2011; Richards 2011; HM Government 2010) and can be categorised 
as emanating from three areas, those being international terrorism, Northern Ireland-
related terrorism, and domestic extremism. The threat from international terrorism, 
and more specifically Al Qaeda and their affiliates and supporters, despite being 
significantly weakened in recent years, is still faced (Cabinet Office 2012), and are 
seen as highly dangerous and a continuing threat due to their absolutist religio-
political beliefs that result in a commitment to mass killing and economic destruction 
and disruption (Wilkinson 2007a). The threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism 
has manifested itself in the form of varied methods of attack, including assassinations, 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and mortar attacks (Wilkinson 
2007b), yet it was arguably the 1996 VBIED attack in Manchester City Centre that is 
most prominent (Harre-Young et al. 2009). More recently, there have been consistent 
attacks in Northern Ireland, resulting in not just a continuing threat (Centre for the 
Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2010), but a growing concern (HM 
Government 2011). In relation to domestic extremism, protests that have resulted in 
public disorder and criminal damage have been evident more recently, including 
widespread rioting that occurred in UK cities in August 2011 (BBC 2011). 
Notwithstanding the targeting of individuals (as above), critical national infrastructure 
and government buildings that has taken place to date (Andrew 2009), Clarke and 
Soria (2009) and Harre-Young et al. (2009) have highlighted that of all the publicly 
known cases of terrorist plots and attempted attacks that have come to light since 
2000, all have involved attacks on crowded public places and/or transport networks, 
and evident too has been the prominent use of VBIEDs.  
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Protecting from terrorism 
Incorporating physical measures into the built environment to deter and mitigate the 
impacts of such attacks and other forms of crime has been undertaken throughout 
history (Briggs 2005: 68), yet it has been the use of such measures in relation to the 
aforementioned terrorist threats that has been increasingly prevalent in debates 
between, and within the realms of, practitioners and academics, as 'fortress 
architecture' and 'defensible space' became synonymous with such protection (Coaffee 
2010). However, it was arguably the onset of Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) that was the basis from which other frameworks and 
typologies of protective measures emerged, with CPTED encompassing access 
control, natural (informal) surveillance, organised (formal) surveillance, territoriality, 
defensible space, and target hardening (Cozens et al. 2001; Moffat 1983). More 
recently, Harre-Young (2012) has developed a typology of CTMs that can be used to 
protect such places, which categorises the measures into three groups, those being 
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM), protective construction, and planning, detection 
and procedures. As part of the same study, a further output was made in the form of a 
theoretical framework that encompassed the factors that influence whether places are 
protected, and the factors that influence the value of CTMs themselves (ibid.).  
PROTECTING THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
The framework presented in Figure 1, derived from a three-year study into the 
protection of crowded places involving interviews with 47 construction management 
and security professionals (the methodology for which is detailed below), highlights 
eight factors that influenced whether crowded places were protected. Two of those 
factors (threat and risk assessments (TARAs), and stakeholder understanding and 
engagement) also influenced the value of CTMs themselves, as did auditing.  
 
Figure 1: A framework of the protection of crowded places (Harre-Young 2012: 41) 
METHODOLOGY 
The aim of the research was to understand (and therefore change or influence) the 
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ontology (Bryman and Bell 2007: 18). In explaining the reality of the situation, 
creating theory as a result of that understanding, and then testing the developed 
theory, the research was iterative in nature due to it being inherently inductive and 
deductive, and required the adoption of a reconciliatory approach to examine and 
understand the 'structures at work' whilst recognising that such understanding was 
subjective and required interpretation (Robson 2011: 31; Walliman 2006: 20). In order 
to capture the subjective nature of the research, a qualitative research strategy and 
respective research methods were used that included interviews, site visits and 
document analysis, all of which were carried out in both the UK and the USA. The 
analysis of data was carried out through analytic induction, in which the universal 
explanation of the phenomenon being studied was sought, through the collection of 
data until no identified cases were found to be inconsistent with the developed 
explanation (Bryman and Bell 2007: 583). Thematic coding was used, with emergent 
themes forming the basis of the theoretical framework, which then became a coding 
frame upon which data was labelled, reflected on, and informed the collection of 
further data (Robson 2011). A total of 47 participants were recruited for the research, 
with the collection of data spanning 16 months. 
THE NEED FOR A BROADER UNDERSTANDING 
Whilst the research furthered understanding in relation to the design, construction and 
operation of the built environment in relation to countering the threat of terrorism, it 
can be questioned whether the development of a theoretical framework in relation to 
the above could be used to understand the mitigation of more than just terrorist 
threats. A range of natural hazards are both more likely and of higher consequence 
than terrorism-related risks (Cabinet Office 2012), so an in-depth understanding of the 
incorporation of protective measures more broadly, as well as their value, seems of 
use practically to those who are responsible for the design, construction and operation 
of the built environment, and pertinent in furthering academic debate and knowledge 
in the area. The previous theoretical framework (Figure 1) is therefore built on in 
order to develop a theoretical framework that could be used to understand the 
incorporation of protective measures to mitigate the plethora of risks that the built 
environment faces, as presented in Figure 2. 
INFLUENCES ON PROTECTING VULNERABLE PLACES 
The eight factors influencing the protection of vulnerable places (obligations, 
incentives, risk assessment, stakeholder understanding and engagement, perceptions 
and occurrences of risks, the economic situation, local planning policy, and building 
stock rotation) are explored below. 
Obligations and incentives 
Legislative, insurance-based and moral obligations determined whether crowded 
places were protected and whether CTMs were incorporated (Harre-Young 2012), and 
literature is clear in stating that interpretations of existing legislation are such that 
'duties of care' do encompass terrorist acts (Harre-Young 2012; Fussey 2011; CPNI 
2010) and that such legislation has been used to prosecute where counter-terrorism 
advice had been received but not acted on (Veale 2009: 291).  
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Figure 2: A theoretical framework for influences determining the incorporation of security 
measures 
Such 'duties of care' apply to all hazards, threats and major accidents that pose a risk 
to places and spaces, and are therefore highly pertinent when designing new places or 
spaces, or renovating/refurbishing existing ones. A range of incentives influenced 
whether CTMs were incorporated, those being reductions in risk and loss of/damage 
to life, property and reputation; accruement of competitive advantages; generation of 
revenue; conduciveness with the agendas of pedestrianisation, regeneration and 
master-planning; and insurance incentives in the form of competitive policies and 
possible reduced excesses (Harre-Young 2012). Incentives to incorporate security 
measures would also remain highly influential, as reductions in risk and loss 
of/damage to life, property and reputation are significant factors upon which the 
incorporation of protection can be based. Harre-Young (ibid.) found that no CTMs 
were explicit to counter-terrorism (every CTM identified had additional benefits), and 
that the minimum additional benefits accrued through incorporating protection was the 
mitigation of other forms of criminal damage and public disorder.  
Rouse (2004: 64) argues that "to account for value of architecture to companies, what 
you actually talk about is value to business" and therefore, in identifying incentives to 
incorporate security measures into architecture (and other built assets), the value of 
doing so to business must be identified, which has been done so in terms of revenue 
generation, the accruing of competitive advantages, the conduciveness of other 
agendas, and gaining insurance incentives (Harre-Young 2012). It could be argued 
that security measures, by reducing the likelihood of and mitigating the impacts of, a 
range of hazards, threats and major accidents, would accrue more significant 
incentives than CTMs alone, benefitting end-users and other stakeholders relatively 
more than if CTMs had only been incorporated. Whilst questions remain regarding 
obligations to incorporate security measures and how such practices are aligned with 
the design, construction and operation of the built environment, it raises whether there 
are in fact a range of incentives that could compel stakeholders to do so, regardless of 
perceived obligations.  
the protection of
vulnerable places
obligations to
incorporate
security incentives to
incorporate
security
perceptions
and occurrence
of risks
economic
situation
local policy
building stock
rotation
risk assessments
stakeholder
understanding &
engagement
the value of the
security measures
influences on the incorporation of
security measures
influences on the value of
security measures
auditing
Risk Management 
1193 
 
Assessment, perceptions and occurrences of risk 
The undertaking and contents of TARAs influenced whether crowded places were 
protected as the outcome of such an assessment could be to protect (the extent to 
which would vary in relation to the type and scale of the terrorist threats faced), or to 
not protect/incorporate CTMs. TARAs are, as a result of the above, inherently 
sensitive and confidential, and should only be conducted by trained people, such as 
Counter Terrorism Security Advisers. The undertaking and contents of risk 
assessments would remain highly influential in understanding the needs of broader 
protection, as they would influence both the incorporation of security measures and 
their value. Arguably, their influence would be exacerbated due to the increased 
complexity in not only determining what hazards, threats and major accidents the 
assessed place or space is vulnerable to, but how each would be reduced and mitigated 
whilst trying to achieve a joined up or 'holistic' approach. Whether any unintended 
consequences of security measures would impact others would also need to be 
understood and identified. Perceptions and occurrences of the risks remain a 
consideration, as peoples' views of risk and of the risks faced will vary, and will 
continue to be influenced by the occurrence or manifestation of them, such as flooding 
events.  
Stakeholder understanding and engagement 
Engagement between, and understanding of, stakeholders was also found to influence 
the protection of crowded places, and would remain pertinent, especially considering 
the aforementioned increased complexity. A solution towards the adequate and 
effective engagement between stakeholders in which security measures and solutions 
could be identified and examined is through the use of charette-type meetings 
whereby architects (and other design professionals) could invite required stakeholders 
to work through such issues, thereby enhancing the quality of the design produced, as 
well as enhance their own understanding (Glass 2008: 180). 
Economic situations, local policy and building stock rotation 
Economic influences are both pertinent to the current situation both nationally and 
internationally, and have been noted as influencing the incorporation of security 
measures through the prioritisation of other agendas over those of security (HM 
Government 2010: 21). This furthers the potential significance of incentives to 
incorporate security measures and therefore highlights a need for research into the 
incentives that are inherent in the incorporation of them. Local policy was proven to 
influence the incorporation of CTMs as different local authorities had different stances 
regarding what CTMs they deemed as appropriate or not (Harre-Young 2012) and so 
it can also be assumed that such influences would remain when considering the 
incorporation of security measures more broadly. This reinforces the need for 
stakeholders to effectively engage and further highlights the need for a platform from 
which this can occur, such as charette-type meetings (Glass 2008), in order to 
understand local policies and produce appropriate and compliant solutions. The 
influence of building stock rotation remains pertinent to the incorporation of security 
measures, as the vast majority of vulnerable places already exist, so the retro-fitting of 
them remains the most likely scenario considering their incorporation. Impetus would 
still need to be put on engaging as early as possible during the design process though, 
as retrofitted measures can cost more and be less effective (Harre-Young 2012). 
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INFLUENCES ON THE VALUE OF SECURITY MEASURES 
Whilst TARAs and stakeholder understanding and engagement evidently influenced 
the protection of crowded places and whether CTMs were incorporated, they also 
influenced the value of CTMs themselves, as did auditing.  The contents of the TARA 
itself, the situational context in which the focus of the assessment resides, the terrorist 
threats faced, and the understanding and incorporation of proportionality all influence 
the value of CTMs, as they can determine whether the proposed or incorporated 
protection is under-engineered and vulnerable, or over-engineered and obtrusive 
(ibid.), and the same can be assumed for protecting against other threats, hazards and 
major accidents given the need for an accurate risk assessment. Stakeholder 
understanding and engagement influences the incorporation and value of security 
measures due to it encompassing, amongst other factors, understanding of the 
requirements, performance and consequences of the measures themselves, a matter 
which if misunderstood could leave places and spaces vulnerable to attack. Auditing 
influenced the value of security measures a lack of, or insufficient, auditing could lead 
to inappropriate and ineffective measures that leave 'protected' places vulnerable to 
attack, that could potentially exacerbate the impacts of an attack, and could therefore 
result in additional capital outlay to remove, make safe, and replace inappropriate 
measures with correct/appropriate ones. The implication here for stakeholders is the 
over-engineering and potential obtrusiveness, or under-engineering and vulnerability 
of the places and spaces planned for and designed, coupled with the potential for 
mistakes in incorporating security measures to exacerbate the impacts of an attack, 
should one occur. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a need for further debate within the construction industry as to the alignment 
of protecting the built environment and any means through which the likelihood and 
impact of disasters are reduced, and the design, construction and operation process. 
Whilst questions remain regarding obligations to incorporate security measures, 
incentives to do so have been highlighted that could compel stakeholders to 
incorporate them, regardless of perceived obligations. A framework has been put 
forward that presents the factors that influence whether security measures could be 
incorporated, as well as the factors that could influence the value of the measures 
themselves. The framework provides a strategic overview of the issues that are of 
relevance to construction managers, inherent in the protection of vulnerable places, as 
obligations exist under legislated duties of care; a range of incentives are evident; risk 
assessments and stakeholder understanding and engagement are highly influential; 
perceptions and occurrences of risks also influence protection; economic influences 
remain highly topical and influential and highlight a need for research into security 
measures and their incentives and value to business; local policy variations influence 
the incorporation and choice of security measures; and building stock rotation also 
influences the incorporation of security measures due to the vast majority of built 
assets already existing and therefore require retro-fitting (Harre-Young 2012). The 
research also highlights the need to consider the incorporation of physical 
interventions into the built environment whilst reconciling their needs with those of 
other design considerations, to understand the intricacies of mitigation within time and 
cost constraints, and to accrue maximum value from incorporating measures, which 
can be achieved through such a framework. Such a framework, it is argued, therefore 
aids those responsible for the design, construction, operation and importantly, the 
protection, of vulnerable places in proportionately protecting built assets that are or 
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could be vulnerable to the plethora of hazards, threats and major accidents that the 
built environment is at risk from, and ensure that they are neither over-engineered and 
obtrusive or under-engineered and vulnerable, or incorporated in such a way that 
could exacerbate the impacts should those risks manifest themselves. 
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